"To think that astronauts died because NASA was more concerned with being politically-correct and environmentally-friendly than they were with keeping astronauts safe is stunning."

I must be far more jaded and cynical than you, Steve, because it doesn't surprise me at all that PC bureaucrats would rather risk lives than offend the environuts.

How are the 1990 clean air act, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, which essentially led to the ban on Freon "Clinton-era Enviro-wacko legislation" ? Clinton didn't take office until 1993. Congress voted to accellerate the ban on Freon from 200 to 1995 in a 1992 session, so again, nothing to do with Clinton, so sorry, you can;t put the Columbia astronauts on your batshit Clinton death list Steve.

But it can be blamed on enviromentalists wackos, and they are always libs. Clinton was a lib, he didn't change it.

TRF: All that may be true but Clinton's veep had a big hand in this BS as did Kerry. And it was people of Clinton's stripe who led the CFC ban movement.

"But it can be blamed on environmentalist wackos, and they are always libs."

Hmmm... As opposed to science and evidence hating conservatives? Please educate yourselves on the facts before beginning on a agenda driven tirade.

Here's an issue brief on the role of Ozone and CFCs in the environment:

http://www.studyworld.com/newsite/ReportEssay/Science/Earth%5COzone.htm

Here's a good summary of progress to date Based on information from those "fringe loonies" from NASA and the American Geophysical Union's Journal of Geophysical Research:

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/07/030730080139.htm

Apparently you armchair warrior rocket scientists know more than Nobel Laureates. How is that?

The Montreal Protocol of 1992 will likely save hundreds of thousands of lives globally. The American Cancer Society projections are that just under 60,000 people will develop skin cancer in 2005.

While there most certainly ARE fringe enviro extremists out there, there is no doubt about the compelling case for CFC bans -- asuming you actually have any greay matter between your ears and an ability to read the mountains of evidence. But I guess it is entirely consistent for partisan right wingers to ignore evidence.

How big was the hole 30 years ago? 50 years ago? 1000 years ago? Scientists answer....."I don't know."

Problem with doom and gloom warriors is that they try to make a definative statement about something concerning the climate and environment looking at a very small amount of data time-points when nothing can be definitive whitout something to compare/contrast it to. Of course, the computer projections can "accurately" predict the weather (not further than 3 days), climate changes (been incorrectly predicting doom-gloom for over 20 years now...with only 2 variable out of 14), and environmental changes (too many variables to accurately predict much)...right?

Of course, if it's gonna be ad hominems all day.....screw.

Steve, what article are you quoting? Do you have a link?

Sarge:

Well, I certainly don't support "doom and gloom warriors", but there's a great deal of data that has been collected by a vast array of researchers including folks at NASA and NOAA. The mechanisms of ozone depletion are well understood.

As far as the ozone hole goes, well I guess that's an interesting problem because intruments to measure such an occurence have only been available for a relatively short duration. While you pose a question that is of great interest to scientists, it's kinda like saying, well, cancer isn't really a problem because we don't have any data on the historic rate of incidence of cancer - so how do we REALLY know that it's on the increase or poses a significant risk?

It is a fact that as ozone depletes, there is a corresponding increase in UVB radiation. This increase has been measured.

It is also a fact (according to EPA) that Chlorine is released as CFCs break down in the stratosphere when they are exposed to solar radiation.

It is also a fact that 1 atom of chlorine can destroy as many as 100,000 molecules of Ozone.

The author claims that the "evidence that it [Freon: which I can only assume the author meant to say CFCs] does any real damage is weak at best" This is absolutely wrong. CFC damage to ozone is a proven fact. It has been demonstrated and observed in the atmosphere. I would challenge the author to support his statement with more than rhetoric.

I think that you are mixing environmental issues here. Ozone depletion is less of a "climate change issue" as it is a solar radiation issue. You might be referring more to greenhouse gasses.

Environmental science is tremendously complicated because of the mindbending array of variables involved. The trouble is that we are looking at a huge system. I agree that we all should be skeptical (that is precisely what true science demands), but we need to review REAL SCIENCE with an open mind to make educated decisions. The flip side of that is that it is sheer folly and very dangerous to absolutely ignore all the data that HAS been collected and call it an "enviro-whacko" agenda - epecially given the author's obviously limited credentials and exposure to research.

[One note: I said the Montreal Protocol of 1992 - this is the latest revision. It was as one poster indicated first promulgated in 1987, then amended in 1990 and again in 1992]

Mike....I fully understand the methods of ozone depletion....right down to the chemical pathways. I ALSO fully understand that, as with every other doom-gloom claim, there's no causality shown. They can put 1 and 2 together and 9 and 10 together....but, scientifically CANNOT manufacture "3 through 8" and have me buy it. Thus far, the most ozone-depleting incident every year is caused by the sun's own radiation and catalyzed by polar stratospheric clouds that arrive in the spring and continue through the summer, which are 100% ice...making a huge surface-area platform for the sun's radiation to do what is does naturally to ozone. Add the Coriolis effect that isn't there in the winter....which draws colder air into the stratosphere (thus forming the PS Clouds) and forms a vortex that varies in size...much like the hole itself (hmmmmm.....).

As a REAL SCIENTIST...I try to only look at the facts given (minus push-poll-like computer projections). "Educated opinions" are nearly useless when those doing the "research" come to the same conclusion that those paying them to do the research were looking for. Why give the real conclusion of "we have no friggin' clue" or the opposite of what they want you to find out if you can make an ambiguous statement that may or may not be true.....and you won't lose your funding.

BTW...you want a great comprehensive look at the hole....check out THIS site....loads of great data....pretty much ALL the data that has been generated thus far.

This, to me, says that it's not the foam that is the problem, but the application process, and sloppy quality control that's causing the problems. Of course, Steve would never miss the opportunity to try to blame Clinton for shit he had nothing to do with (Which Aaron also attempts on a concurrent thread as well), but it looks like you'll have to take the Columbia astronauts off your stupid Clinton Death List...I'll post the text since you have to register to get the article from NYT

HOUSTON, Aug. 3 - An internal NASA report last December warned of deficiencies in the way insulating foam was being applied to sections of the fuel tank to be used on the shuttle Discovery's current mission.

The report was provided to The New York Times by a person outside the space agency who is part of an informal network of people concerned about shuttle safety, and it did not recommend against launching the Discovery. But it delivered a harsh critique of the quality control and practices at the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans.

That plant, managed by a major space contractor, Lockheed Martin, had come under intense criticism after a foam accident at liftoff led to the loss of the shuttle Columbia and its crew of seven astronauts in 2003.

While the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spent two and a half years and some $200 million to address foam problems after the disaster, they resurfaced on July 26, when a piece of foam as much as 33 inches long broke from the tank two minutes after liftoff. Future shuttle flights have been suspended until the problems are resolved.

The December 2004 report, by Conley Perry, a retired NASA division chief for quality engineering at the Johnson Space Center here, said it was obvious that Lockheed's external tank engineers "did not do a thorough job" of identifying the quirks and variations that can occur when foam is applied by hand. And despite the space agency's insistence that it would not allow scheduling pressures to dictate a return to flight before it was safe, Mr. Perry wrote, its reluctance to re-evaluate the quality-control problems "stems from the 'schedule-first' attitude" of Lockheed Martin management.

According to the report, even after two years of effort to correct the foam debris problem, "there will continue to be a threat of critical debris generation."

"This variable could reasonably be eliminated," the report went on, "and yet it continues."

The 23-page document was initially sent to safety managers by e-mail and came to be distributed more broadly. The person who provided it to The Times did so on condition of anonymity, saying he had not been authorized to read it.

Mr. Perry declined to discuss the document when reached by telephone.

The report was also reviewed by the independent group that monitored the space agency's progress in improving safety. A spokesman for that group referred questions to NASA.

David Mould, the agency's assistant administrator for public affairs, said a point-by-point response to the report was prepared but could not be released at this time because the information fell under confidentiality rules of the export controls that govern space technology.

But Mr. Mould added: "NASA and its contractors have made a number of process and quality improvements in the manual application of foam on the external fuel tank which have resulted in substantially less debris coming off the tank at launch. But as we saw, we still have work to do with the foam."

He continued, "There are still issues that we need to address and we will do that."

Marion LaNasa Jr., a Lockheed Martin spokesman, said, "We will defer to NASA regarding specifics of the memo, but would strongly emphasize that safety and quality are the guiding forces behind our workmanship on the external tank."

A former director of the Johnson Space Center, George Abbey, said that he had seen the paper and that its conclusions were cause for concern.

"You would think that American industry could solve and fix this whole problem when you look at what they've done to develop the technology that's gone into the rest of the shuttle," Mr. Abbey said.

As they prepared for the shuttle fleet's return to orbit, officials said they expected to see no foam bits larger than 0.03 pounds fall off the new tanks during the launching. The foam that broke away two minutes into the Discovery's liftoff, narrowly missing the craft, weighed 0.9 pounds. At least three other pieces also exceeded NASA's safety limits.

The agency administrator, Michael D. Griffin, has appointed a "tiger team" of engineers to find the causes of the incident and ways to fix the problem.

Attention has focused on the manufacture of the tank and on the area where the largest piece of foam fell off, a long aerodynamic feature known as the protuberance air load ramp, or PAL ramp.

The agency had long recognized that the PAL ramp could be a source of foam debris. Like the part of the tank in the Columbia's last mission, known as the bipod arm ramp, the foam on the PAL ramp is applied by hand. Those areas have tended to lose more foam than the large surface areas of foam that are applied by machine. Although flight histories showed only two incidents of foam loss from that ramp, the last in the early 1980's, there were dozens of night launchings in which falling foam would have been missed.

After the loss of the Columbia, NASA considered removing or redesigning the PAL ramp. But agency officials said that no good alternatives emerged, and ultimately decided not to change it. Instead, the ramp would be examined through an internal scan that would not require cutting into the material, to look for the air pockets, or voids, that are the leading cause of foam shedding.

Agency officials have broadly admitted since then that this decision was a mistake. As Dr. Griffin said in a television interview on Sunday, "We goofed on that one."

Mr. Perry's report did not dispute the decision to fly the tank with the hand-applied foam. According to the document, "there is no credible information available to bring into question the existing areas that have been designated as 'use as is' foam areas."

The paper concluded: "Notwithstanding the concerns discussed herein, I am comfortable with the decisions made by the various groups that identified the areas that required redesign and those that can be flown 'as is.' "

According to the report, Tank 121, which would be put on the Discovery flight, was "ready to support the resumption of flight operations."

As a test engineer, Mr. Perry worked on the investigation of the Apollo launching pad fire that killed three astronauts in 1967, and he conducted the test in which NASA burned a mockup of the capsule.

He retired in 1993 but was called back in the aftermath of the Columbia accident by the space agency's return-to-flight office of safety and mission assurance and was asked to monitor the quality of the operation at Michoud.

Mr. Abbey, the former Johnson Space Center director, said he was not surprised that Mr. Perry would not call for long delays over the PAL ramp issue, even though his overall criticism was so strong.

"I think he was probably torn between his recognition of the urgency to fly again and his concern about the tank," Mr. Abbey said.

He added that the problem with foam and the tank had needlessly undercut the successes of the return-to-flight mission. "You've got a complex system that's working amazingly well," Mr. Abbey said. By contrast, there have been persistent problems with "this essentially passive element that doesn't do much more than hold the fuel" for the eight and a half minutes it takes to reach orbit.

"That's given the shuttle - a great system - a bad name," he said. "And that's not fair."

Everything I've seen says that the number of damaging foam-strike incidents increased dramatically after they were forced by the EPA (following regulations in place by the Act and subsequent updates to the Act) to switch the type of foam applied sometime in the '96-97 time frame.

This new study is all about the CURRENT foam and the different application processes (the newest being better than the oldest, but not as good as the old foam and procedure)....not the difference between the better older foam and the "newer more brittle foam".

You DO read the articles, don't you?

Yes, and it tells me that the foam is not the problem, it's the way it's being applied. Furthermore, it's telling me that sloppy QC plays a large part in the problem as well. The new foam would be effective if it was installed properly.

And I don't see how Steve can pin the 1990 clean air act, the vote in congress in 2000 that accelerated the ban on freon and the 1987 Montreal protocol on "Clinton era environmental wackoism"

TRF....with ONLY the CURRENT foam...they THINK it's the application process that's the problem, but looking at the foam itself....it's the FOAM that's the problem. There's no evidence that says the new foam will work as well as the old foam. Better than the new foam with teh old application process, but not as good as the old foam that was done away with by Clinton's EPA. If there was a known problem about the foam, they could've just had a waiver for 'em like they waive every other outlyer of every other ban. The vote in congress in 2000 has nothing to do with the banned foam being phased out in '97.